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FINE TUNING CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH TO
INJURED PARTICIPANTS IN ACTIVE SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Participation in active sports is reasonably safe,' but it
occasionally exacts a heavy toll.2 In 1992, the California Supreme
Court struck a balance between protecting the public's interest in
recreation and the claims of injured athletes. In Knight v. Jewett,3 it
held that "liability properly may be imposed on a participant only
when he or she intentionally injures another player or engages in
reckless conduct that is totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity involved in the sport" (the Knight rule).4 This rule reflects
the reasoning that "vigorous participation... would be chilled if
legal liability were to be imposed on a participant on the basis of...
ordinary careless conduct."
5
1. See Michael J. Stuart et al., Injuries in Youth Football: A Prospective
Observational Cohort Analysis Among Players Aged 9 to 13 Years, 77 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 317 (showing that serious injuries are uncommon in youth
football). Seven percent of football players under age fourteen studied over the
course of one season received severe enough injuries to prevent them from
participating for the rest of the season. Id. No serious head, neck, or back
injuries occurred. Id. at 318.
2. Tamara C. Valovich et al., Repeat Administration Elicits a Practice
Effect with the Balance Error Scoring System but not with the Standardized
Assessment of Concussion in High School Athletes, 38 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING
51 (2003) ("The incidence of injury to the head, neck, and spine has been as
high as 13.3% of reported injuries in high school football.... The rate of
sport-related traumatic brain injuries.., was [ten per 100,000] 15- to 24-year-
old male subjects."); Bob Putnam, The Deadliest Sport in America, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at 8C (stating that an average of one death
occurs in pole vaulting each year out of approximately 25,000 active
participants); Staff Report, Stay Safe While Splashing, OCEAN COUNTY
OBSERVER, Aug. 7, 2003, at A4 (noting that, every year, thousands nationwide
experience spinal cord and head injuries from diving into shallow water).
3. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal.Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
4. Id. at 318.
5. Id.
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In Kahn v. East Side Union High School District,6 the court
applied the Knight rule in the case of a public school swim coach
who directed a fourteen-year old member of his team to perform a
hazardous dive that terrified her, for which she was untrained, and
during which she was unsupervised.7 The court understood the issue
in Kahn to be whether the defendants should have been liable for
"push[ing the] plaintiff beyond her capabilities or [increasing] her
risk in some other way."8 It ruled that Kahn could not recover unless
she proved her coach was at least reckless. 9
In the 1938 case of Bellman v. San Francisco High School
District,10 the same court applied a negligence standard to very
similar facts. The Kahn dissent would have ruled as the Bellman
majority did," and vice versa. 12 The court in Bellman compensated
an athlete injured by a coach's ordinary negligence, while the Kahn
court erected a protective shield for coaches by heightening the
standard to recklessness. A decision under the Bellman rule could
produce injustice to a sympathetic defendant, while a decision under
Kahn could be unfair to a sympathetic plaintiff. The Bellman and
Kahn opinions suggest that the court has been seeking a happy
median somewhere between negligence 13 and recklessness 14 for at
least sixty-five years.
6. 31 Cal. 4th 990, 75 P.3d 30, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103 (2003).
7. Id. at 995-96, 998. In her dissent, Justice Kennard wrote that in
applying the Knight standard to the conduct of a professional coach for novice,
teenage athletes, the majority did not take the difference between athlete
participants and coaches into consideration. Id. at 1023 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
8. Id. at 1001 (internal quotations omitted).
9. Id. at 995-97.
10. 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938).
11. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1021-25 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
12. Bellman, 11 Cal. 2d at 589-93 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
13. Generally, negligence is "[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation. ... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056 (7th ed. 1999). It is
constituted by unreasonably risky conduct that breaches a duty of care owed to
another, and which proximately causes harm to that other. See DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (2000).
14. In general, recklessness is conduct demonstrating a conscious disregard
for safety. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (7th ed. 1999) (reckless is
"[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence but
nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk."). The
defendant must be "conscious of the risk," or have "specific reason to know
1274
INJURED SPORTS PARTICIPANTS
While the Knight rule, which requires active sports plaintiffs to
prove recklessness, is generally sensible, the facts of Kahn suggest
that the rule should not be rigidly applied where certain factors are
present in a sports injury case (the "Kahn factors"). 15 In Kahn, the
court should have lowered the protective shield of recklessness and
tried the case based on ordinary negligence.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of California case law
pertaining to injured active sports participants. Part III.A compares
Kahn with Bellman. Part III.B presents the Kahn factors, which
courts adjudicating disputes involving active sports injuries may find
useful. Part III.C addresses policy concerns. The Kahn factors
suggest that athlete safety and the public's interest in recreation need
not be mutually exclusive.
II. OvERVIEW: BELLMAN, KNIGHT, KAHN
A. Protecting Athletes: Bellman, 1938
In the fall of 1934, Belva Bellman, a seventeen year-old high
school sophomore in San Francisco, was enrolled in a standard gym
class. 16 When she attempted to re-enroll in the gym class in the
spring, the teacher in charge of registration told her the ordinary
classes were full, and instead placed her in a "Beginners' Tumbling
Class."'17 Belva took the tumbling class under protest.' 8 She told her
tumbling instructor she did not want to take tumbling, but the teacher
said if she did not, she would not receive her credits. 19
To pass this class, the school required Belva to successfully
perform at least ten of eighteen separate exercises.20  The more
exercises she performed, the higher her grade would be.21 According
to Belva, the physical education teacher gave her no direct
about it," and proceed anyway, "without concern for the safety of others."
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 351 (2000).
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. Bellman, 11 Cal. 2d at 580.
17. Id. at 580-81.
18. Id. at 583.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 580.
21. Id.
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instruction.22 Instead, advanced students in the class showed her
how to perform the tumbling exercises. 23
One of the exercises was called the "roll over two. ' 24  This
exercise involved the tumbler "tak[ing] a short run and div[ing] over
two persons who are on the floor on their hands and knees,
alight[ing] on outstretched arms, and with the head curled under in
order to complete a forward roll, com[ing] to a standing position.
',21
Performing the roll over two, Belva fell "many times... on top of
the girls on the floor."26 During one such attempt, Belva struck her
head and was injured.27
The school district disputed the facts and claimed that Belva was
contributorily negligent. However, the California Supreme Court
invoked the existing School Code and upheld a jury verdict finding
the district liable for ordinary negligence. 29  The court held that
Belva had produced sufficient evidence to support a verdict for the
plaintiff:
either upon the theory that the 'roll over two' [was] not an
exercise suitable for senior high school girls or that
appellant's employees knew or should have known that
because of the respondent's mental or physical condition
she was not a proper subject for such instruction, or that the
class teacher did not properly instruct and supervise her.3°
The evidence also showed that the exercise could result in injury
if not performed properly.
3 1
The dissent protested that "courses in physical education
[would] be curtailed or eliminated, depending on the degree of
'guess' indulged by the school authorities on what a jury would say
about it." 32 Citing authority that is still valid, the dissenting justice
stated that "the law does not make the school districts insurers of the
22. Id. at 583.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 580.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 583.
27. Id. at 580, 586-87.
28. Id. at 580-81.
29. Id. at 580-81, 583.
30. Id. at 583.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 589 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
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safety of the pupils."33 The tumbling course, it argued, was no
different from tumbling classes in thousands of schools.34 The
school district had done nothing more than operate in accordance
with "universal practice." 35 In other words, the Bellman decision
infringed upon a public interest in recreation.
B. Protecting Recreation: Knight, 1992
Query how the court's decision in Bellman might have differed
if, at the same time that Belva lunged flawlessly to perform a "roll
over two," one of the two girls on the floor suddenly rose, and Belva
collided with her. This is the nature of the scenario with which the
court was confronted in Knight in 1992, where it established the
general rule that active sports participants must prove at least
recklessness to recover for their injuries.
36
On Super Bowl Sunday in 1987, Kendra Knight and Michael
Jewett were enjoying a party at a friend's residence.37 At half time,
the revelers decided to go outside for a game of touch football.38
During the game, Jewett ran into Knight. 39 "[Don't] play so rough or
I['11] stop playing[!]" she told him.4° On the next play, however,
Jewett stepped on Knight's hand, causing an injury that resulted in
the amputation of one of her fingers.4
The court reasoned that "a participant's normal energetic
conduct often includes accidentally careless behavior. ' 42  Jewett
argued that "by participating in the game in question, [Knight]
impliedly... agreed to reduce the duty of care, owed to her by
defendant, to only a duty to avoid reckless or intentionally harmful
33. Id. (Shenk, J., dissenting) (citing Goodman v. Pasadena City High Sch.
Dist., 4 Cal. App. 2d 65 (1935)); see, e.g., Rodrigues v. San Jose Unified Sch.
Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 842, 845 (1958); Woodsmall v. Mt. Diablo Unified
Sch. Dist., 188 Cal. App. 2d 262 (1961); Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist., 68 Cal. App. 4th 939 (1998).
34. Bellman, 11 Cal. 2d at 589.
35. Id. at 591 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
36. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318 (1992).
37. Id. at 300.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 300-01.
42. Id. at 318.
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conduct.' 43 The court was persuaded.44 It stated that liability did not
depend on whether Jewett's conduct was reasonable, but "on the
nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant [was] engaged
and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity
or sport. ' '45 The court held that defendants did not have a duty to
eliminate risks inherent in a sport, but that they did have "a duty to
use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above
those inherent in the sport.' '46 The court expressly stated that this
rule could apply to coaches.
47
"[V]igorous participation[,]" the court held, "likely would be
chilled if legal liability were to be imposed on a participant on the
basis of his or her ordinary careless conduct."48 The Knight decision
43. Id. at 302.
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 309.
46. Id. at 316. In Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), the California Supreme Court held that, in general, every
person owes a duty to use due care to avoid injuring others. Id. The Rowland
court also held that subject to certain factors, it is possible to fashion
exceptions to this rule. Id. at 112-113. The set of factors is not finite or
exclusive, however, the court provided eight "major factors" (the "Rowland
factors") for evaluating such possible exceptions. Id.
It is unclear whether the Knight court considered the Rowland factors.
The court in Knight does not specifically discuss them. It mentions Rowland
once, immediately before stating that "the nature of a sport is highly relevant in
defining the duty of care owed by the particular defendant." Knight, 3 Cal. 4th
at 315. This could mean that the nature of a sport (i.e., whether it is active) is a
"minor factor" under Rowland, or it could mean the Knight court did not
consider the Rowland factors at all.
It is therefore an open question as to whether Knight overruled Rowland
with respect to the Rowland factors. If it did, then precise guidance for
determining what may constitute an exception to the reasonable care standard
is not presently available. If it did not, then Knight must be consistent with
Rowland.
There is no indication that in Kahn, the appellate or supreme courts
considered the Rowland factors. Like other California courts, the Kahn courts
simply applied the rule that dangers inherent in active sports constitute an
exception to the standard of reasonable care established in Rowland. See, e.g.,
Calhoon v. Lewis, 81 Cal. App. 4th 108, 116, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394 (2000);
Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1003 (2003).
47. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318.
48. Id. at318.
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thus protected the public interest in recreation, as the dissent in
Bellman would have done.49
C. Bellman Redux: Kahn, 2003
Eleven years after Knight, Olivia Kahn was a fourteen year-old
high school freshman in San Jose, California.5° Although she did not
have experience as a competitive swimmer, Olivia was competent
and decided to try out for the junior varsity swim team.5' She told
the team coaches52 she had a lifelong fear of diving into shallow
water and suffering a head injury.53 Coach Andrew McKay assured
her she would not have to dive at meets, and that she could start
inside the pool.54 At the meets preceding her injury, McKay had
Olivia start in the water.55  However, minutes before a meet in
October 1994, about a month after joining the team, McKay told
Olivia she would have to dive.56
Olivia panicked and begged McKay to change his mind
7 "I
told him... I did not know how to do the dive and.., had never
49. Bellman v. San Francisco High Sch. Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 589 (1938)
(Shenk, J., dissenting).
50. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995; Howard Mintz, School Coaches Watch S.J.
Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 3, 2003, at IA, available at
http://nI.newsbank.com/nl search/we/Archives?p action=doc&pdocid=OFB7
6BCD585EO19B&.
51. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 998; Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 96
Cal. App. 4th 781, 786, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 360 (2002) [hereinafter Kahn
Ct. App. Decision].
52. Two coaches supervised the swimming program, Coach McKay and
Coach Chiaramonte-Tracy. Both were district employees. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at
998.
53. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 786; Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at
998.
54. In relays, three out of four team members dove into the pool, while one
started from inside the pool. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 998. McKay did not
concede that he promised Olivia would never have to dive. Id. at 1012.
55. Id. at 998.
56. Id.; Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 786. Because McKay
reneged on his promise that Olivia would not have to dive at swim meets, she
might have been able to base a claim upon promissory estoppel. See Kevin P.
McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational
Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1768, 1804-07 (1995).
57. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 998.
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dove into the racing pool in my life.",58  McKay was unmoved.
Olivia testified that he told her to "dive in off the blocks or [she was]
not swimming." 59  The dive involved propelling herself from an
eighteen-inch platform into three and a half feet of water, and
dipping below the surface in a shallow arc rather than skimming it.
60
In the few minutes remaining before the start of the meet, Olivia thus
began to practice this dive.6 1 Doing so, she broke her neck and
suffered permanent injuries.
62
McKay asserted he had previously told Olivia and the other
team members that they were not to practice diving without a
coach's direct supervision.63 He testified that he was unaware Olivia
had begun practicing after he told her she would have to dive.
64
Thus, he argued, her decision to dive was a superseding cause of her
injury, but the court was not persuaded.65
58. Maura Dolan, Putting the Hurt on Coaches, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2003,
at Al.
59. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 787; John
Woolfolk, Recalling Day Life Changed, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Aug. 30, 2003, at IB, available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-
search/we/Archives?p__action=doc&p docid=OFD46CDADF6FC5BE. McKay
"denied informing [the] plaintiff that she would be off the team if she refused
to dive on the day she was injured." Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1012. He also
asserted that he told Olivia she could dive from the pool deck if she wished.
Id. at 999.
60. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 997-98. The pool conformed to National
Federation of State High School Association guidelines. Id. at 998.
Competition swimmers dive in a shallow arc just beneath the surface because
diving straight out would slow them down. Woolfolk, supra note 59, at lB.
61. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995; Maura Dolan, Justices Set Limits on Coach
Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Aug 29, 2003, at B 1; John Woolfolk, Ex-S.J Swimmer
Can Sue District, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2003, at IA.
62. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995; Dolan, supra note 61, at BI; Woolfolk, supra
note 61, at IA.
63. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 999-1000.
64. Id. at 999.
65. Id. at 1016-17. The court referred to Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified
Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970), which
determined that an unsupervised student's misconduct is not necessarily a
superseding cause of an injury, where the misconduct was something that
could be expected of adolescents who are not adequately supervised. Kahn, 31
Cal. 4th at 1017 (citing Dailey, 2 Cal.3d at 750-751). Olivia stated that the
coaches did not instruct the team to refrain from practicing without direct
coach supervision. Id. at 998. Coach Chiaramonte-Tracy did not recall
McKay giving such an instruction. Id. at 1000. Moreover, Coach
1280
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Olivia dove under protest. Moreover, she said she received no
training from her coaches or teammates in shallow-water racing
diving between the start of the swim season and the accident.
66
Instead, McKay directed other team members to help her practice
diving off the deck of the diving pool into the deep water.67 When
she had done so, she had come in too deeply.
68
While McKay sat nearby completing paperwork, two teammates
offered to show Olivia how to perform the racing dive in the minutes
she had left.69 One of them simulated the starting gun with a clap.70
At the first clap, Olivia froze and stared at the water.71 At the second
and third claps, she dove, and came in dangerously deep. 72 "I really
can't do this," she thought, "but I... [have] to... help my
teammates. 73 She could see McKay from the comer of her eye.74
She dove, this time striking the bottom, and her body curled
reflexively into a fetal position.
75
McKay disputed the facts, but the court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment.76 Olivia based
her claim on ordinary negligence.77 The trial court, however,
understood the case in terms of "primary assumption of the risk.,
78
Chiaramonte-Tracy testified that she did not give or hear McKay give
instructions about the danger of improper diving into shallow water. Id.
66. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1015. McKay disputed this assertion. Id. at 1012.
67. Id. at 998.
68. Id. The team's other coach, Coach Chiaramonte-Tracy, noted that
Kahn's entry level dive was "a little too deep," as did Kahn's teammates. Id.
at 998, 1000.
69. Id. at 998.
70. Woolfolk, supra note 59, at lB.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 998.
75. Woolfolk, supra note 59, at lB.
76. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 996.
77. Id. at 997.
78. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th 781, 785-86. Where the
doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applies, the plaintiff is unable to
prove a prima facie case because the law provides that the defendant had no
duty of care with respect to the conduct that caused the plaintiff's injury. DAN
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 537 (2000). For example:
courts often hold that landowners are free to leave dangerous
conditions on their land, so long as those conditions are not hidden. If
someone is injured by a dangerous but obvious condition on the land,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1273
The defendants argued that Olivia's decisions to join the team and to
dive at the swim meet were voluntary, and that she had assumed the
risks inherent in the sport of competitive swimming.79 In a split
decision, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate
District accepted the defendants' argument and granted summary
judgment.8 0 "To instruct is to challenge," the court reasoned, "and
the very nature of challenge is that it will not always be met."
8'
Citing Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious & Cultural
Center,82 the Court of Appeal also stated that courts should not
impose liability upon an instructor for asking a student to "take
action beyond what, with hindsight, is found to have been the
student's abilities. 8 3
The California Supreme Court, however, pointed to the fact that
primary assumption of the risk does not turn on whether conduct is
voluntary.8 4  Unlike in Bellman, where it required only proof of
ordinary negligence, the court in Kahn held that to recover, Olivia
would have to convince a trier of fact that McKay had been at least
the landowner is frequently not liable because he is under no duty of
care with respect to conditions on his own land.
Id. In the Kahn trial, the appellate and supreme courts all discussed primary
assumption of the risk. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995; Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96
Cal. App. 4th at 785. However, all three courts recognized that under Knight,
the law did not state that coaches owe athletes absolutely no duty of care; they
recognized Knight simply holds coaches to a duty not to be reckless, rather
than negligent. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995-96; Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal.
App. 4th at 790-92. Therefore, Knight did not in fact hold that cases related to
sports injuries involve primary assumption of the risk. It merely elevated the
duty of care owed from negligence to recklessness.
79. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 997.
80. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 797.
81. Id. at 795 (quoting Bushnell v. Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr.,
43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (1996)).
82. 43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (1996).
83. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 795 (quoting Bushnell, 43
Cal. App. 4th at 532).
84. "[P]rimary assumption of risk... does not turn on plaintiffs...
decision to encounter [a risk] voluntarily, but on... whether defendants owed
her a duty of care." Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1016. If the court had applied the
traditional rule of assumed risk as consent, DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
535 (2000), and held that Kahn voluntarily assumed the risk of diving, would it
also be true that McKay voluntarily assumed the risk of training minors to
perform hazardous activities?
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reckless-something it felt a jury could legitimately determine.8 5
"[T]he object... is to avoid recognizing a duty of care when to do so
would tend to alter the nature of an active sport or chill vigorous
participation in the activity."
86
Unlike the Bellman court, the Kahn majority did not consider
whether diving from a platform into shallow water is "an exercise
suitable for... high school [students.], 87  In Bellman, the court
considered the plaintiff's mental or physical condition to be a
legitimate factor in finding the district liable.88 However, the Kahn
court stressed that coaches must be able to "'push[]' a student to
attempt new or more difficult feats .... , 89 Like Bellman, however,
the Kahn court stated that failure to instruct could be a factor in
finding the district liable. 90 Olivia's evidence also convinced the
court that the dive she attempted was "ultra-hazardous" in the
absence of adequate training.
91
Meanwhile, the dissent in Kahn would have followed Bellman,
applying a standard of ordinary negligence.92 Whereas the California
Supreme Court, in accord with the Court of Appeal, agreed that
"coaches who merely challenge their students to move beyond their
current level of performance have not breached a duty of care,, 93 the
dissent protested that "any teacher, no matter what the subject matter,
85. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1013.
86. Id. at 1011. The court suggested that applying negligence in the context
of sports could have implications for public safety; it could discourage the
training of skiers to rescue other skiers. Id. at 1010.
87. Bellman v. San Francisco High Sch. Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 583 (1938).
88. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1006.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1012.
91. Id. at 999. Kahn produced a Red Cross safety training manual for swim
coaches which instructed that diving into water less than five feet deep is
dangerous, and that 95 percent of swimming injuries occur in water five feet
deep or less. Id. It instructed that, "[e]ven an experienced diver can be
seriously injured by diving improperly... or diving from starting blocks
without proper training and supervision." Id. McKay claimed he followed the
manual by starting Olivia off with dives into the deep diving pool, but the court
noted there were no starting blocks adjacent to the District's deep pool. Id. at
1012, 1015.
92. Id. at 1021 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1001 (referring to Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at
795).
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challenges students to perform with ever greater skill and to
undertake progressively harder tasks."94
Applying a heightened standard, the Knight rule is logical as a
general rule. However, it has a tendency toward harshness that
seems ripe for tempering over time. According to the court in
Knight, for example, "[e]ven where the plaintiff, who falls while
skiing over a mogul, is a total novice and lacks any knowledge of
skiing, the ski resort would not be liable for his or her injuries." 95 It
seems unlikely that Knight can truly be a hard and fast rule given the
permutations of such a scenario. Fine tuning seems inevitable.
III. ANALYSIS: FINE TUNING THE KNIGHT RULE
A. Comparing Kahn with Bellman
Either the reasoning of Bellman (ordinary negligence) or that of
Knight (recklessness) could have controlled in Kahn. Bellman and
Kahn both involved high school athletes who were ordered by
teachers to perform dangerous maneuvers about which the students
had misgivings. By relying upon Knight, the court raised the
question as to how to distinguish Bellman.
The cases might be distinguishable on the basis that Bellman
was forced into tumbling, whereas Kahn's swim team activities were
voluntary. Yet the Kahn court clarified that the voluntary nature of
Olivia's conduct was irrelevant to its decision.96 It does not seem
distinguishable that Bellman was engaged in a formal class while
Kahn's activities were extracurricular, given that colleges today
place great emphasis on participation in activities outside the
classroom.
The distinction might be that while Bellman was an ordinary
gym student, Kahn was a competitor. The Kahn court thought a
potential chilling effect was especially undesirable at "a competitive
level. 97 However, it is not clear what constitutes a competitive
level. Professional athletes perform at a competitive level, but it is
less clear to what extent junior varsity swimmers do. Some might
94. Id. at 1024 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
95. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 316 (1992).
96. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1016.
97. Id. at 1007.
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say that junior varsity swim meets are competitive, while others may
counter that the "real athletes" are on the varsity teams.
It is even less clear whether Bellman was performing at a
competitive level. She was, after all, not in an ordinary gym class,
but rather a specialized class for tumblers. Either way, given the
court's more recent reasoning in Knight and Kahn, it seems unlikely
that the court would find Bellman's tumbling coach liable today.
There does not appear to be a meaningful distinction between the
two cases. The question is whether Bellman is still good law.
Notwithstanding the court's 6-1 decision to apply the Knight
rule in Kahn, the court may have had some misgivings. A measure
of indecision, for example, would explain why it felt compelled to
point out that it believed a trier of fact could find McKay reckless.
Recklessness is a question for an impartial jury, not a remanding
court. Perhaps the court was gesturing to the plaintiff, improving the
chances of a settlement in her favor.98 If so, it had its cake and ate it
too, maintaining the Knight rule intact while providing for a de facto
exception under the facts of Kahn.
99
Moreover, the court qualified its opinion to apply Knight by
stating that courts should "keep[] in mind.., that different facts are
of significance in each setting."'100 It did not explain how the
significance of different facts was related to its holding that the
Knight standard should generally apply to sports instructors.' 0' The
court explained that it "recognizes that the relationship of a sports
instructor or coach to a student or athlete is different from the
relationship between co-participants in a sport," but it did not explain
how, and its ruling did not reflect this view.
02
The facts of Bellman provided no basis for that court to
authorize finding the school district negligent on the rationale that
the "roll over two" was "not an exercise suitable for senior high
98. After the court ruled in Kahn, the plaintiff's attorney expected the case
to settle. Dolan, supra note 61, at B 1.
99. With reference to the Kahn decision, University of Berkeley Emeritus
Law Professor Stephen Barnett stated that "[b]y letting this case go to the jury,
the court indicates that recklessness doesn't have to be all that reckless."
Dolan, supra note 61, at B 1.
100. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011.
101. See id. at 996.
102. Id.
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school girls."'10 3 On the other hand, school sports programs did not
simply vanish during the period between Bellman and Knight, when
the rule in cases involving school sports-related injuries was ordinary
negligence. Both the Bellman and Kahn courts could have gone
farther to balance the various interests at play in cases involving
injured active sports participants.
B. Kahn Factors
The court's statement that "the standard set forth in Knight...
should generally apply to sports instructors, keeping in mind, of
course, that different facts are of significance in each setting,"
implies that there may be exceptions. 1 4 Perhaps the court was not
ready to announce one in Kahn. The court stressed the need to
protect the public's interest in recreation, perhaps wary of unintended
consequences. In the wake of the announcement that the court would
hear Kahn, Little League Baseball and the American Youth Soccer
Organization expressed fears that a ruling for the plaintiff could
cause them to be "buried in lawsuits."' 1 5 Cities complained that
"[the] entire aquatic pool budget [of a small city] would probably be
insufficient to cover the cost of [a single] trial,"'1 6 and the California
Ski Industry Association presented written and oral arguments on
behalf of the defendant school district.
0 7
Though the court applied the heightened Knight standard of
recklessness, the seeds of an exception are present in the Kahn
opinion. The facts of the case suggest mitigating factors that might
merit an exception to the Knight standard in future cases, should
fairness so dictate. These factors are: 1) the probability of serious
injury; 2) the sufficiency of training and supervision; 3) the existence
103. Bellman v. San Francisco High Sch. Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 583 (1938).
104. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011.
105. Woolfolk, supra note 61, at IA.
106. Brief of City of San Luis Obispo, et al. as Amicus Curiae at 15, Kahn v.
E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990 (2003) (requesting an extension
of time to file and presenting arguments in support of defendant E. Side Union
High Sch. Dist.), available at http://www.cacities.org/userfiles/godoc/
6487.Kahn%20v.%2OEast%2OSide%20UHSD%20-%20Amicus%2OBrief.htm
(Nov. 5, 2002). Presumably, even small cities could afford insurance to
provide for such contingencies.
107. Maura Dolan, Putting the Hurt on Coaches, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2003,
at Al.
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of a well-known alternative to the challenged conduct; 4) the
plaintiff's skill level; 5) the defendant's status with respect to the
sport; 6) the extent to which the plaintiffs injury is related to
pressuring on the part of the defendant; 7) the age disparity between
the plaintiff and the defendant; 8) the defendant's relationship to the
plaintiff; and 9) the existence of a deeply seated fear.
1. The probability of serious injury
Unlike Knight, Kahn was not about a game of touch football
among friends. The court recognized that Olivia's dive entailed a
serious risk of injury. 10 8 In deference to an interest in recreation, the
probability of serious injury should hardly be decisive in isolation.
Yet, combined with factors such as the plaintiffs age and skill level,
it might be important.
For example, where the matter concerns a novice who is a
minor, it should be relevant that an activity could foreseeably
produce a neck, brain or spinal injury. Kahn's expert testified that
the dive was "ultra-hazardous," while a Red Cross manual stated that
diving from a racing platform was the principal danger faced by
persons learning to compete. 0 9 The court recognized that most
injuries resulted from diving into shallow water. 
1 10
It is possible to be paralyzed while returning a volley in tennis,
but paralysis is far more likely in pole vaulting."' Where the
probability of serious injury is high, the court should consider
whether or not Knight automatically applies.
2. The sufficiency of training and supervision
This factor should carry little weight in an informal setting, such
as where a neighborhood "dad" shows local kids how to catch fly
balls. It will have no relevance where training is not an issue, such
as where swim team members organize a soccer match on their own.
The factor might become significant, however, when combined with
a probability of serious injury and a coach who is a state employee.
108. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1015.
109. Id. at 999, 1011.
110. Id. at 1015.
111. See Putnam, supra note 2, at 8C.
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McKay should have done more than merely ask Olivia's teammates
to instruct the novices.
11 2
3. The existence of a well-known alternative to the
challenged conduct
In active sports, people need to weigh alternatives, and juries
should not second-guess decisions made under pressure by people of
varying experience. Yet, this factor might carry weight where there
is a gross disparity between the safety of the well-known alternative
and that of the challenged conduct. For example, the court in Kahn
found that a specific sequence of training was necessary to perform
the dive safely; 1 3 this contrasts starkly with McKay's last-minute
order to "dive or else."
4. The plaintiff's skill level
The fact that Olivia conveyed to McKay that she felt unprepared
to dive was not significant in itself. 1 4 Nor was the fact that she
repeatedly made dives that came in too low. Her skill level might
have been important, however, in light of the facts that the activity
was "ultra-hazardous" and that McKay was Olivia's public school
teacher.
5. The defendant's status with respect to the sport
Arnold Schwarzenegger could be guilty of negligence for
merely shaking the hand of a constituent, if in so doing he happened
to break the constituent's hand. This is because courts recognize that
a weightlifter has "[s]uperior or specialized knowledge or skill"
'"15
that is a relevant factor in adjudicating whether a person can be liable
for negligently shaking hands. Analogously, the fact that a defendant
receives most or all of her compensation from sports-related
activities, or that she is licensed for her sports-related activities by a
respected authority, might be relevant. Perhaps she is a retired
professional athlete, or referees for professional games in her spare
time.
112. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4that 1017 n.5.
113. Id. at 1017.
114. Id. at 1017 n.5.
115. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF ToRTS 290 (2000).
1288
INJURED SPORTS PARTICIPANTS
Of course, just because someone excels in a sport does not mean
that person should not enjoy the protection of Knight; that would
defeat the rule. However, it is true that McKay's specialized
knowledge placed him in a superior position to gauge whether it
made sense for Kahn to dive at the meet. 16 McKay's superior
specialized knowledge and skill might have been considered a factor
in combination with other factors, such as the probability that Olivia
would suffer a serious injury, and the sufficiency of the training and
supervision she received.
6. The extent to which the plaintiff's injury is related to pressuring
on the part of the defendant
If McKay's demand had not come at the last minute at a
competitive meet and been accompanied by a threat to remove Olivia
from competition, she might have been able to reflect and to decide
not to dive. Naturally, active sports entail decision making under
pressure, and the simple fact that a defendant pressured a plaintiff
into a decision cannot hold weight. However, it may be a factor if
the case involves a novice, an authority figure, and a particularly
hazardous activity.
7. The age disparity between the plaintiff and the defendant
It would hardly be fair to automatically consider age as a factor
wherever a differential existed between a plaintiff and a defendant.
However, age may be relevant to determining how or if peer
pressure, a lack of maturity, or deference to authority was related to
the plaintiff's injury. The court might thus accord some weight in a
case where the claimant was a minor novice, while the defendant was
an experienced adult who failed to provide training.
8. The defendant's relationship to the plaintiff
The dissent in the Kahn Court of Appeal decision pointed out
that the risk of harm may vary with the authority of the defendant.
117
In combination with factors such as the extent to which the defendant
pressured a novice in relation to a hazardous activity, it could be
116. See Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1023 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
117. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4t', 781, 803 (2002) (O'Farrell,
J., dissenting).
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relevant whether the defendant controls a plaintiff's grade, her ability
to compete, or her access to special opportunities.
9. The existence of a deeply seated fear
A distinction should be drawn between the natural anxiety of
straining toward the next level in a sport, and mortal fear of a known
hazard."18 Olivia was not merely nervous about the competition; she
had visions of her blood all over the pool. 119  People are
idiosyncratic, of course, and the mere existence of such a fear should
not be sufficient to lower the "shield" of Knight. However, it does
not serve the public interest in recreation to "push" an athlete to the
extent Olivia was pushed in Kahn. McKay did not push Olivia
forward; he pushed her over a cliff. Where a defendant with
authority directs a plaintiff to perform a hazardous activity of which
she has expressed a mortal fear, it does not seem patently
unreasonable to hold that the defendant owes her the duty of care of
a reasonable coach under the same or similar circumstances.
10. Summary
The above factors are not intended for the trier of fact; that
would make a jury's task too complicated. Instead, they are offered
to assist courts in determining under what standards specific cases
involving injuries to active sports participants should be tried. They
provide for flexibility in cases involving gross disparities in
knowledge, training, experience, and responsibilities between
plaintiffs and defendants.
120
118. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011-12.
119. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 798.
120. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1019-20 (Werdegar, J., concurring). These
disparities are analogous to the "gross inequality of bargaining power"
associated with unconscionable contracts, which negates a "meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties" and gives courts reason to pause when
deciding whether to enforce disputed agreements. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.15 (rev. ed. by Joseph M. Perillo, West Pub. Co.
1995).
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C. Policy Interests
It was reasonable for the Kahn court to place great weight upon
a public interest in recreation. 21 The court may have considered
additional policy interests, including: 1) trust; 2) education; and 3)
the value of active sports.
1. Trust
The dissenting justice in Kahn wrote that minors think of
coaches as mentors and role models. 122 Minors "trust the coach not
to carelessly and needlessly expose them to injury."'123 Given the
inherent risks of active sports, it is certainly important to provide
coaches with latitude in performing their duties. There is also an
interest in ensuring that where serious risks to safety are involved,
coaches do in fact perform those duties. 124 Parents entrust teachers
with their children's safety. McKay's conduct violated that trust.
The dissenting appellate court justice in Kahn stressed that
rather than chilling competition, recognizing a duty to adequately
train might produce the opposite effect. 125 This is because it would
build trust in the reasonable safety of competition.
2. Education
Bellman is relevant to Kahn because the events of Kahn did not
take place exclusively within the context of active sports. It involved
a high school student and a teacher on state property, in a state
facility, and under a program that the state funded and regulated.
School sports are not just about recreation. Novices take up sports
"not only to compete, but also to learn."'126 Even if learning
121. In Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968), the California Supreme
Court stated that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, there should be no
exception to the standard of reasonable care unless it is "clearly supported by
public policy". Id. at 112.
122. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1023 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
124. As far as Kahn's attorney was concerned, this was the crux of the case.
"It's a situation of a coach not doing his job," he said. Mintz, supra note 50, at
1A.
125. Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th 781, 804 92002) (O'Farrell,
J., dissenting).
126. Id. (O'Farrell, J., dissenting).
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sometimes unavoidably entails risks, there is a community interest in
providing a reasonably safe learning environment.
127
Schools are full of perils. As the dissent in Kahn points out, the
court applies a standard of ordinary negligence in cases involving
shop instructors 128 and chemistry teachers, 29 notwithstanding the
risk of chilling enthusiasm for carpentry, or halting the march of
scientific progress,
Acknowledging that public school teachers, in particular, owe
students a duty of supervision, the Kahn court cited to a statute and
to Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District.130 The Dailey court
stated that in California, school authorities are duty bound to
supervise the conduct of children on school grounds and to enforce
regulations necessary to protect them. 131 Under Dailey, the standard
of care imposed when school personnel breach the duty to supervise
is ordinary negligence.132 Dailey cites Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger
Co. 133 as authority for this rule-and Taylor, in turn, cites
Bellman.134  Thus, although the Kahn court never mentioned
127. See Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011. Relying on prior appellate court
decisions, the appeals court in Kahn decided that "a school district's duty to
supervise its students does not 'trump' the doctrine of primary assumption of
the risk." Kahn Ct. App. Decision, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 791.
128. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1024 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Ahem v.
Livermore Union High Sch. Dist., 208 Cal. 770, 284 P. 1105 (1930) (fourteen
year-old student not instructed on the use of guards on a power saw); Calandri
v. Ione Unified Sch. Dist., 219 Cal. App. 2d 542, 33 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1963)
(judgment for school district and shop teacher reversed in student's negligence
action).
129. See, e.g., Mastrangelo v. W. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 540,
42 P.2d 634 (1935) (evidence was sufficient that district was negligent where
chemistry student was injured in an explosion); Dangaard v. Oakland High
Sch. Dist., 212 Cal. 316, 298 P. 983 (1931) (chemistry teacher should have
known the dangerous character of explosive gases); Reagh v. San Francisco.
Unified Sch. Dist., 119 Cal. App. 2d 65, 259 P.2d 43 (1953) (defendant teacher
had a duty to supervise where plaintiff student was unfamiliar with the use and
characteristics of inherently dangerous and hazardous chemicals).
130. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1020 n.1. (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West
1993)); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. District, 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470
P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970) (cited in Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1020 n.1).
131. Dailey, 2 Cal. 3d at 747.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 109 P.2d
1044 (1941)).
134. Taylor, 17 Cal. 2d at 600.
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Bellman, it upheld Bellman by affirming that the defendants' duty to
supervise included the obligation to protect Olivia from her own lack
of mature judgment.13
5
Recognizing a policy interest in education does not require
removing danger from diving, or preclude the possibility of diving
accidents. It simply protects the public's interest in recreation by
setting a minimum threshold for safety where the dangers are great.
3. The value of active sports
There is a public interest in the values associated with active
sports, including health, personal growth, teamwork, discipline,
dedication, achievement, and fun. If the law recognizes the
importance of recreation to decisions about sports-related injuries, it
should also recognize that sports should enhance health, and not
unreasonably jeopardize it. Where extreme hazards and
inexperienced athletes are involved, courts should not place their
stamps of approval upon machismo and winning at all costs. Teens
are already prone to take inadvisable safety risks without
encouragement from the state. 136 Where a decision is made based on
an interest in recreation, that decision should be made with an eye
toward the value of that recreation.
4. Summary
The above list is not exhaustive, of course. Many cases
involving active sports injuries will involve a number of policy
concerns that ought to be considered in determining what standard to
apply. Knight will apply in the overwhelming majority of these
135. Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1017. The Kahn concurrence considered
legislative intent, citing statutes that grant qualified immunity to certain
participants in and sponsors of socially useful enterprises. Id. at 1020
(Werdegar, J., concurring). The statutes cover diving, although dives from
diving boards or diving platforms are expressly excluded. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
831.7(b)(2) (West 1995). Where these statutes are applicable, plaintiffs must
prove gross negligence to recover; correspondingly, the concurrence would
have applied a standard of gross negligence rather than recklessness. Kahn, 31
Cal. 4th at 1020-21 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
136. "Not wanting to disappoint her teammates, the shaken 14-year-old
Kahn steeled herself and approached the pool to practice the dreaded dive with
a friend." Woolfolk, supra note 59, at lB.
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cases, but the decision to apply the Knight rule should not be
automatic.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Knight rule provides that active sports participants may be
liable only for conduct that is at least reckless. However, the rule
should not operate to excuse all negligent conduct simply because a
dispute happens to involve an active sport. The majority opinion in
Bellman recognizes that in certain cases involving active sports
injuries, there are competing policy interests that should be factored
into court decisions. The facts of Kahn suggest possible factors that
might help a court to decide whether or not to apply Knight when
presented with exceptional facts.
If the Kahn court had applied these factors, it might have
concluded that where districts choose to include competitive diving
in on-campus activities at their high schools, those districts and their
coaches could be liable for ordinary negligence if they fail to provide
adequate training and supervision. Such a conclusion would not
infringe upon the ordinary citizen's privilege to sky dive, ride horses,
or race automobiles.
Coaches of active sports reasonably direct athletes to engage in
activities that can and do produce injuries. 137 Applying the Knight
rule, the Kahn court concluded that a plaintiff in Kahn's situation
could have no recourse unless the factfinder determined that the
defendant was reckless or acted intentionally-even where the
defendant was a knowledgeable, experienced adult who failed to
provide an inexperienced, unskilled, minor plaintiff with any training
or supervision at all. 138 Given the unusual facts of Kahn, the Knight
rule requires the plaintiff to prove too much.139 McKay's conduct
137. See, e.g., Lupash v. City of Seal Beach, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1428, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 920 (1999).
138. Justice Kennard wrote that by the majority's view, McKay's alleged
failure to train and supervise was "of no legal consequence," and a coach of
teenage athletes "need have little concern for their physical safety." Kahn, 31
Cal. 4th at 1021 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
139. Based on this decision, ski industry attorney Joseph Collins
commented, "Only in very rare situations will there be lawsuits by injured
athletes against their coaches, and only when there's a viable allegation of
recklessness." Woolfolk, supra note 61, at 1A. "At least good news from a
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was callous and dangerous. Applying the Kahn factors proposed
above would permit a court to use the law to discourage such bad
conduct, in accordance with a primary goal of tort law. 140  The
resolution of the issue of how best to approach questions related to
injured participants in active sports will involve the recognition of a
legitimate interest in the enjoyment of competition under reasonably
safe conditions.
Glenn Anaiscourt*
defense standpoint is that the majority opinion set that bar relatively high," said
East Side School District attorney Mark Davis. Id.
140. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 3-4 (2000).
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